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THE NOISY CONFLICT
OF HAlF-TRUTHS
By DORIS C. MEYERS

THE CENTURY CLUB
ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
Bloomington, Illinois .

Address by Associate Professor Doris C. Meyers
on the occasion of the
CentuM} Club Dinner
held on May 7, 1971
Menwrial Center
Illinois Wesleyan University

Mrs. Meyers had been chosen by the faculty,
students and administration as recipient of the
Century Club Award for 1971

INTRODUCTION

During this past year I have been working on some aspects of
the thought of the English nineteenth century philosopher John
Stuart Mill. When my husband and I were in London last January
we visited the National Portrait Gallery and while there looked
for Mill's portrait. We did not find him among either English
philosophers or English literary men (though he qualified for both
groups); instead he had been placed among the few who were
categorized as "prophets." This classification is not at all far-fetched.
The far-ranging scope of his concerns and their relevance to most
of onr contemporary concerns is striking. The great bulk of his
writing, particularly his essays, periodical articles, and such books
as Three Essays on Religion, On Liberty, and The Subjection of

Women, has an astonishing immediacy. At a time when the word
urelevant" is most often misused as a synonym for "contemporary,'�
I would like to examine with you some of his words both in their
relation to the history of an attitude and for their pertinence to
day. My title "The Noisy Conflict of Half-Truths" is a quotation
from Mill's essay on Coleridge. It indicates both my theme and
one of Mill's most persistent concerns: the complex nature of
truth and the necessity of a reasoned dialectic in onr attempts to
reach truth.
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"Antagonistic modes of thought [are J as necessary to one another
in speculation, as mutually checking powers are in a political con
stitution," wrote John Stuart Mill in his essays on two apparently
irreconcilable thinkers, Jeremy Bentham and Samnel Taylor Cole
ridge. Mill called them "the two great seminal minds of England
in their age," and believed that the combination of these two
''half-men'' and their opposed ideas would have constituted some
thing very near to the whole truth of the nineteenth century in
England. For Mill, the truth inherent in any single point of view
can only be properly estimated when it has infiltrated into minds
of very different convictions-"when the noisy conflict of half-truths
has subsided, and ideas which seemed mutually incompatible have
been found only to require mutual limitations." Actually, Mill
asserted, Bentham and Coleddge "were connected by two of the
closest bonds of association-resemblance and contrast," and "all
that is positive in the opinion of either of them is true."!

Mill's conviction that the only possible approach to truth is a
dialectical one is grounded in his philosophy of history and on
the laws of social progress which he believed are to be discovered
in the movements of history. He believed that the single most
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significant factor causing social and historical change is the ability
of man to speculate and the nature of man's opinions and beliefs.
In the sixth book of his Logic he wrote:
Every considerable advance in material civilization has
been preceded by an advance in knowledge, and when
any great social change has come to pass, either in the
way of gradual development or of sudden conflict, it has
had for its precursor a great change in the opinion and
modes of thinking of society.
Mill did not, as did Aristotle, proceed on the assumption that
"all men by natnre desire to know." In fact he recognized that
such curious and inquring men are woefully few. In an early
series of articles which he called "The Spirit of the Age," he
developed the theory that history is essentially an alternation of
two sorts of epochs, "Natnral" and "Transitional." A natnral (or
"Organic") period is one of comparative calm and settled convic
tion, in which the men who hold power tend to be those who are
best equipped to rule and there is a general unanimity of outlook
and belief. The age of transition is-as its name implies-an un
easy yet necessary period of change. Mill's own time, he believed,
was "pregnant with change." Such a time is distinguished by a
wider diffusion of superficial knowledge without the necessary
balance of wise authorities whose influence unites profound knowl
edge with the power to disseminate it. The state of public opinion
in such a time is chaotic, says Mill, and "the young are ready to
advertise for opinions." It is true that the settled order of the "nat
uraf' period sometimes gives rise to a confidence in itself which
is both blind and unfounded; but a time of transition is one of
"suspicion and distrust"-of intellectual confusion when, as the
poet Yeats wrote of a more recent period of chaos and change:
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.2
One of the unhappiest consequences of such a time is the dog
matic divisions among men, the major division being between what
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Mill called "men of the past," to whom the manifestations of the
times are cause for terror and revulsion, and "men of the present,"
for whom they are a "subject of exaltation-new men who insist
upon being governed in a new way.'" This division is frequently
identical with the gap between the generations-though this is
not necessarily the case. In such a time old opinions are discarded
but no new ones which can win any sort of unanimous consent are
established. Such a state is "at best one of convalescence rather
than of health," says Mill. TI,e gradual recovery of health implied
in the word convalescence is manifested, he believed, in tl,e
erosion of old and entrenched prejudices at such a time tluough an
increase of the discussion of ideas-of the dialectical examination
of different viewpoints.
Unlimited discussion is the cornerstone of Mill's theory of truth
and progress; yet he was fully aware of its dangers and pitfalls.
He knew that to discuss means to question established opinions.
He knew that the discovery of new truths is not nearly "so certain
a consequence" of discussion as is the discovery of error, and that
"the moment and tl,e mood of mind in which men break loose
from an error is not ... the most favorable to those mental pro
cesses which are necessary to the investigation of truth." V\That
causes error in the first place, he believed, is our rooted "incapacity
for seeing more than one thing at a time," and when we break
with the old habits of thought we do not necessarily lose this habit
of onesided dogmatism. Mill wrote in The Spirit of the Age that
Whether men adhere to old opinions or adopt new ones,
they have in general an invincible propensity to split the
truth, and take half, or less than half of it; and a habit
of erecting their quills and bristling up like a porcupine
against anyone who brings them the other half, as if he
were attempting to deprive them of the portion which
they have.'
There is no more persistent theme tluoughout Milrs writings than
the conviction that truth is complex and manifold and must never
be without the stimulus of a polar opposition if it wishes to sur
vive. He wrote in On Liberty that
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Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a
question of the reconciling and combining of opposites
that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and im
partial to make the adjustment . . . without the rough
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under
hostile banners.5
This dialectical cast of mind which recognizes the contradictions
at the heart of things and realizes the necessity, in Mill's words,
for the "reconciling and combining of opposites," has a long history.
Just as the men of transitional eras are divided between "old" and
"new," so men throughout history have been divided between those
who are uncomfortable without an either/or or a nothing/but ap
proach to trnth, and those who are able to accept the necessary
tension of the both/and.
Mill based his dialectical approach to practical trnth on what
he believed to be the laws of historical change, while others have
built upon their metaphysical conceptions of the nature of the
universe. Foremost among these last is Heracleitus, who lived in
the fifth century B.C. The fragments which remain to us of his
cryptic utterances have had an influence out of proportion to
their length. The persistent philosophical dilemma of the one
versus the many, of whether there is cosmic unity underneath the
confusion of multiplicity, found a creative reconciliation in the
teachings of this Pre-Socratic philosopher. For Heracleitus, as for
many more recent thinkers, the nniverse is better understood as a
process of becoming rather than as a state of being, as in con
stant change and flux instead of remaining within fixed categories.
Yet underneath the tension and interplay, the alternation and ex
change of opposites, Heracleitus asserted, there exists the physical
nnity of cosmic fire, "kindled in measure and quenched in mea
sure," and the spiritual nnity of the Divine Mind or Logos. "From
things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony," he wrote;
and again, "That which diflers with itself is in agreement; harmony
consists of opposing tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre."6
The early nineteenth century philosopher Hegel was profonndly
influenced by Heracleitus, and like him believed that the clashing
interaction of opposites are united within the Divine. Hegel
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thought that the iuevitable "accidents" of human experience are
to be conceived of iu teITIlS of the "Divine Idea working itself out
through history." But Mill once confessed that he ''became nausea
ted" whenever he read Hegel; and certainly there is a broad diver
gence of spirit between Hegel's arbitrary resolution of conflicts
within the limits of a single fixed system and Mill's insistence on
the necessity of a continuiug live and open-ended dialectic.
Another great thinker who fully realized the tension of op
posites was Goethe. It was from Kant's scientific writings, he said,
that
I grasped the idea that attraction and repulsion are es
sential constituents of matter and that neither can be di
vorced from the other iu the concept of matter. This led
me to the recognition of polarity as a basic feature of all
creation.
And later he wrote, "They say that given two diametrically op
posed opinions, the truth lies midway between them. Not at all!
It is the problem that lies between them-life eternally active but
mistakenly conceived as at rest.''' This statement of Goethe's pro
vides an essential warniug to counteract those who tend to simplify
contradiction by recourse to compromise. The purely quantitative
middle position, as Aristotle pOiuts out iu his Ethics, can actually
be less true than one of the extremes on <lither side. The "golden
mean" is not a quantitative one.
Goethe was a major influence on the thiuking of the GeITIlan
novelist Thomas Mann. A view of reality as infinitely rich and
complex and of truth as many-sided is a theme in all of Mann's
novels, but particularly in The Magic Mountain. In the climactic
"Snow" chapter of that novel, he writes that "man is the lord of
counter-positions."
Persistent iuquiry, an attitude of toleration, and discussion be
tween adherents of different Viewpoints, then, is the necessary
means, according to Mill, for the attaiument of vital and necessary
truths. In his book On Liberty he deals with what he calls "the
real morality of public discussiou." He believed that one of the
most essential prerequisites for becomiug a philosopher is iutellec
tual receptivity-the ability to learn from other miuds. (It was

7

THE NOISY CONFLIGr OF HALF-TRUTHS

Bentham's inability to thus learn that caused Mill to refer to him
as a "one-eyed" man.) Mill believed that verdicts of opinion should
be determined by individual circumstances, and that anyone who
displays "a want of candor, malignity, bigotry, or any intolerance
of feeling" should be condemned. Equally, anyone should be
honored-on whichever side-who has the "calmness to see and
honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are
suggesting nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing back which
tells . . . in their favor." It is especially important that the pro
ponent of a particular viewpoint, he said, should "listen to all that
is said against him-profiting by the part that is just and ex
pounding the fallacy of what is not."·
Even such ideal discourse is beset with some real dangers, Mill
realized. Dispassion and open-mindedness can easily become an
uncritical subjectivism. In times of transition, especially, men are
apt to rely indiscriminately on private judgment. Uninformed men,
unable to understand and appreciate an argument, tend to blame
the argument rather than themselves. "Truth, they think, is under
a peremptory obligation of being intelligible to them." One of the
reasons that in such times personal judgments are preferred to
those of authority is that the many divisions among the authorities
cause the uninstructed to lose faith in them. Then it is that the
"amateur of ideas," with unbounded confidence in his own opin
ions, however crude and unreasonable they may be, feels justified
in rejecting the qualified person as a mere "theorist." "And that
word," writes Mill, "which expresses the highest and noblest ef
fort of human intelligence is hlrned into a byword of derision.'"
(I need not cite chapter and verse here from the mass of recent
anti-intellectual and anti-academic pronouncements in order for you
to recognize the modem parallels. Everyone from Timothy Leary
to Martha Mitchell has had his say as the accepted oracle of
our time.)
Another cause for the rejection of reasoned truth is the tendency
to equate reliable judgment with something loosely called "com
monsense." Mill, like Aristotle, believed fumly in the authority of
cumulative humau experience; but one must always make sure,
he says, "that the conclusions of commonsense are confumed by
accurate knowledge."
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Then there is the danger that the "half-instructed"-being only
half-convinced-will be easy victims of the sort of propaganda or
persuasion that twists the truth. "There is not a truth," wrote Mill,
''however obvious and simple, the evidence of which an ingenious
and artful sophist may not succeed in rendering doubtful to the
uninformed, who insist upon judging all things by their own light."
Finally, perhaps the most insidious danger of all, an exposure to
free discourse can sometimes prove so unsettling to the dogmatic
person that he may take refuge in a pervasive scepticism and re
fuse any further active commitment or involvement. "A person
may be without a single prejudice," said Mill, "and yet be entirely
unfit for every purpose in nature. To have erroneous convictions
is an evil, but to have no strong or deep-seated convictions is an
enormous eviL"lo Mill's great ability to learn from other minds
was never an excuse for scepticism or vacillation on his part. He
believed in systems of connected truth in polities and ethics as
well as in the natural sciences; but he also believed that human
nature must proceed step by step in seeking them.
Today's conflict of half-truths is a particularly noisy one, and
the combatants are particularly polarized and alienated from each
other. The tendency of the young to "advertise for opiniOns"
rather than to seek them from the wisdom of their elders or from
the past has become a hackneyed topic today. Mill saw the mani
festation of this spirit in his time as another example of the victory
of half-truth. Certainly the wisdom of age is not necessarily char
acterized by "narrowness of mind and obstinate prejudice." He
points out in ''The Spirit of the Age" that the opinions and feelings
of older people are more deeply rooted than are those of the young
and such long-standing convictions are "essential to all dignity . ..
and to all fitness for guiding and governing mankind." But he
warns that in a time of upheaval deep-rooted convictions can
very quickly become self-defensive prejudices. It is in such times,
Mill says, that it becomes possible that the young do know more
than the old, since it is much harder to unlearn than to learn;
fortunately, most of the time society has more need of learning
than unlearning.In the case where the young do know more, their
half of the truth-the truth of the "new men"-is as inadequate as
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the other half would be alone. "There is but little wisdom in any
one head . . .," says Mill, "at a time when the young are wiser than
the old."ll
Claims and counter claims for the Establishment versus the so
called "Counter-Culture" ring out on today's noisiest battlefield.
There are those like Theodore Roszak, author of The Making of a
Counter-Culture, who see today's rebellion against authority as a
vitally necessary alternative to what Roszak calls "the final con
solidation of the organized technocracy toward which our society
is moving inexorably." The arguments of those who share this
viewpoint range from the lyrically brilliant vision of Charles Reich's
The Greening of America to the often mindless effusions of those
already integrated within unstructure, who-since their standards
are wholly and proudly subjective-are unable to discuss their
rationale in terms of any broader perspective.
Pitted against the defenders of the Counter-Culture are voices
of frightened hate advocating ruthless suppression of all dissent.
Fortunately there are also other and more dispassionate observers
who seek to understand rather than to condemn, to trace causes
and suggest remedies rather than merely to "view with alarm."
Some historical and psychological analysts have compared the var
ious manifestations of today's "flight from reason"-the growth of
mystical cults of all sorts, drugs, deafening rock music, nihilistic
art, ash·ology, tarot card, violence and vandalism, and similar pat
terns of behavior in the United States since Hiroshiroa-to the be
havior of Cenh·al Europeans in the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries, a time in which masses of people obsessed with the
terror of death sought refuge in madness.l2
Today's fiction, for instance, grows increasingly apocalyptic; and
there is a growing number of writers who deal with the subject of
madness in modern society. One of the best known is Doris Les
sing, whose novels, particularly her most recent, Briefing For A
Descent Into Hell, deal with this theme. The "other half of the
truth" in this novel and in various recent psychological studies of
the subject is that in such times as ours, madness is often a more
appropriate response to a sick society than so-called "normalcy"
and "adjustroent" to its pressures. The psychologist Laing in his
book The Politics of Experience says that at times madness can
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be "a breakthrough as well as a breakdown." The poet Theodore
Roethke in the poem "In a Dark Time," asks
What's madness but nobility of soul
At odds with circumstance?
More constructively, perhaps, Alvin Tomer in his best-selling

Future Shock compares our breakneck flight into an uncharted
future to the astronauts' space flights, with the crucial difference
that we are unprepared and without protection. He writes that
"the dizzying disorientation and breakdown of rational response
when people are overwhelmed by demands for rapid adaptation
[is J threatening to the future of rationality itself." He too views
the manifestations of unreason in our culture as symptoms of
breakdown. He analyzes the various kinds of inadequate responses
that we tend to give to the contradictory demands of our time.
Two of these maladaptions are particularly related to the theme
o f half-truth: one inadequate response, says Tofiler, is reversion to
formerly successful but now irrelevant adaptations. Such nostalgic
solutions are not limited to the conservative elements in our society;
Tomer believes that "the same glorification of the past infects the
various hippie offshoots of the new left as it does the extreme
right." Indian headdress, granny glasses, bucolic communes are
all of them attempts to ape a Simpler past. He calls such manifesta
tions "the Rousseauistic cult of the Noble Savage," and ''Reversion
ism masking as Revolution." Closely allied with this response is
the adaptation of the "Super-Sinlplifier," who clutches, he says,
at "one single neat equation" as the answer to all problems. A
Single idea or single "villain" is invested with universal relevance:
e.g., such formulized half-truths as Dr. Spack's permissiveness is
the root of all our evils; all protest is the result of an organized
Communistic conspiracy; LSD will provide the heightened vision
that our times require; violence is the only way to end violence
and correct abuses; etc. Reductive answers such as these do serve
to remove frustrating doubt from their holders, but, says Tomer,
they "dangerously evade the rich complexity of experience."
Recently, in a New Yorker article, the critic George Steiner, writ
ing of new developments in the life sciences and their impact on
all of our lives. said:
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Not since the sixteenth century has scientific and philoso
phical thought been as conscious of the woven texture of
experience, of the multitudinous skeins and cross-weave
of relations whereby human consciousness, language, and
the phenomenology of the 'real world' are close bound.!3
The both/ and habit of mind has always been found in the few
rather than the many and has always involved the rare and difficult
ability to live with tension, with unresolved dilemmas, and without
the security of a single solution. Mill's analysis of such difficult
transitional times included the hope and vision of an ensuing
synthesis-a return to the more organic wholeness of a "normaY'
time after the necessary adjustments and changes are made. Yet,
unless we count the period immediately preceding World War I
as such an organic era, it appears that the century since Mill wrote
has been merely an accelerating time of change and upheaval.
Today we face a more uncertain prospect than even the "'new
men" of Mill's time could anticipate. Though Mill never minimized
the degree to which a time of transition could dislocate those
enduring its uncertainties, and though he scrupulously avoided the
temptation to settle for any forced or premature synthesis, he
nevertheless firmly believed in the '1aws" of social progress and
in the inevitable return to a new and better peliod of equilibrium.
Most of us today cannot go much beyond a commitment to the
''hazardous perhaps" of an unknown future. Some men, too, have
begun to doubt whether there is any necessary ending to a time
that Mill thought of as transitional. Yet today, as always, there
are the few who are convinced that the nature of truth demands
an open rather than a closed attitude.
Approaching eighty, in the last year of his life, Thomas Mann
closed his essay on Chekov with these words which pOignantly
characterize his life-long habit of mind:
To the question 'What am I to do?' one can but answer:
'Upou my honor and conscience, I don't know.' Neverthe
less one goes on working ... giving form to truth, hoping
darkly, sometimes almost confidently, that truth and serene
form will avail to set free the human spmt and prepare
mankind for a better, lovelier, worthier life.!4
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And elsewhere, Nietzsche warned such rare individuals that
The hour presses men and so they press you. And from
you too they require a Yes or a No. And woe to you if you
want to set your chair between For and Against. Do not
be [concerned J, lover of truth, because of these inflexible
and oppressive men. Truth has never yet clung to the arm
of an inHexible man.'s
One of Mill's most powerful (and least accepted) arguments i n

On Lib81ty i s directed toward the vital service that free discussion
renders to even the most unquestioned and thoroughly established
values and truths. "However true a opinion may be," he writes,
"if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be
held as a dead dogma, not as a living truth." If Truth itself re
mains unchallenged and unexamined, "it abides in the mind, but
abides as a prejudice"; so that if the "opponents of all important
truths do not exist it is indispensible to imagine them and to supply
them with the strongest arguments."
Last year at the Century Club dinner my friend and colleague
Jerry Stone discussed the need for the human and the technical
aspects of life to be brought into "one single focus," and for the
union of Christian and secular insights to be fused into one sub
stance of truth. I hope he will forgive me for borrowing a sentence
from his fine talk: he said that "Education should participate in
unfolding the forms through which life's meaning is expressed." I
would make it even stronger-Education must participate in such
an unfolding. The University must remain a place where a free,
responsible, and vital dialectic can flourish, or it will become a
closed prison of old half-truths that have lost their meaning and
force.
Certainly the free exchange of opinions can and does sometimes
develop partisans more deeply entrenched in prejudice than be
fore. Mill deplored what he called the "sectarianism" of his day,
and we are suffering greatly from the "polarizations" in our society.
But this danger, as well as all the other risks of a free dialectic, is
inHnitely less threatening to society than fanatical repression and
closed-minded dogmatism-on whatever side they manifest them-

13

THE NOISY CONFLICl' OF HALF�TRUTHS

selves. As Mill wrote in On Liberty, "It is not the violent conflict
between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half the
truth that is the formidable evil."
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